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No-Fault: The Road to Reform
T. Lawrence Jones*
The American Public deserves a better automobile insurance system than it has
today-one that will be available to all people; one that will provide payments
promptly and as expenses are incurred; one that will provide rehabilitation and
a productive contribution to society; and, one that will have more reasonable
costs, fairly allocated among the motoring public.
There is a great need therefore to strive for genuine no-fault automobile
insurance reform-a measure designed to correct an often tragic waste of our
nation's human, social and economic resources.
This conclusion by the members of the American Insurance Association, who
write approximately 30 percent of the nation's auto insurance, was reached
after a comprehensive study' of the failures of the existing system-as reflected
by public criticism-and of what might be done to correct those failures.
Legal scholars have been pointing to these failures since the early 1930's.1 But
it has been in recent years that the failures of the existing fault system have
become most evident.' Now, after several objective and wide-ranging studies by
educators, government agencies, professional groups and consumer representa-
tives, the fault system stands condemned as a means of compensating people
for their auto accident injuries.4 In the words of John A. Volpe, Secretary of
* President, American Insurance Association
1. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVAL-
UATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARA-
TIONS (1968).
2. See generally Hogan & Stubbs, The Sociological and Legal Problem of the Uncompensated
Motor Victim, I I ROCKY MT. L. REv. 12 (1938); Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its
Consequences, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1936).
3. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM chs. 1-3
(1965). See also L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); Morris & Paul,
The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1962); A. EHRENZWEIG,
"FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A VOLUNTARY COMPENSATION PLAN (1954).
4. See sources note 3 supra; see also N.Y. DEP'T OF INSURANCE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . .
FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? [hereinafter cited as AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE]; Needed: A Basic Reform of
Automobile Liability Insurance, 27 CONSUMER REP. 404 (1962): Calabresi, The Decision for Acci-
dents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs. 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965).
Road to Rejorni
Transportation:
[Tihe existing system [of auto insurance] ill serves the accident vic-
tim. the insuring public and society. It is inefficient, overly costly.
incomplete and slow. It allocates benefits poorly, discourages reha-
bilitation and overburdens the courts and the legal system. Both on
the record of its performance and on the logic of its operations. it
does little if anything to minimize crash losses.
5
Wasting our Legal Resources
Although the fault system fails society chiefly as a compensation system, it also
fails society by consuming so much of our legal and judicial resources which
are so badly needed in other areas of the law. Reform of the auto insurance
system per se will not automatically result in reform of our judicial system. On
the other hand, no program to reform the court systems can be successful or
meaningful that does not have the removal of all auto accident cases from the
civil courts as its first priority.
There are 15 million auto accidents a year that represent potential lawsuits.,
These potential cases hang over the court system and will keep the backlog at
the level of four to seven years in urban areas regardless of any other steps for
improvement that might be taken. Only the fact that a very lengthy delay can
be expected in many areas keeps most of these potential cases from being filed.
These potential cases will "absorb" whatever improvements might be achieved
by other changes. That has been the record in Philadelphia, Chicago and any
other place where serious efforts for improvement have been made.
7
Evidence to this effect was presented in Congressional hearings earlier this
year by Benjamin Mackoff, Administrative Director of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois. who reported continuing long delays in the courts in
spite of a series of "bold and innovative measures." ' Mr. Mackoff stated that
[diespite the implementation of a variety of techniques to expedite
litigation, the delay continues at an increased rate. Those courts that
have kept pace with the steady rise of such filings (personal injury
cases) have done so only at the expense of other vital areas of the
law which then suffer from similar delays, or worse yet, "bargain
basement justice." 9
5. U.S. Dep'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 100 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES].
6. NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1970).
7. See generally Hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 241 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of The House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on No-Fault Motor Vehicle
Insurance, 92d Cong., ist Sess., pt. I, at 142-47 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
8. 1971 Hearings, supra note 7, at 143.
9. Id. at 146.
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Increasingly, jurists, legal scholars, attorneys and journalists are identifying
auto accident cases as the leading source of court congestion. As Chief Justice
Warren Burger has stated:
[V]ery, very good arguments can be made and have been made for
taking automobile and other personal injury cases out of the courts
entirely, out of all courts, and disposing of them by other means
. ... I am just very sure that there must be a better way to dispose
of automobile litigation than the cumbersome and inefficient and
expensive processes of the adversary system. ' "
In October 1970, New Jersey Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub publicly advo-
cated a system of no-fault auto insurance to help alleviate the jam of lawsuits
which is clogging New Jersey courts."
A major study, citing criminal and civil matters that could be removed from
the courts, said:
All these reforms would be overshadowed if the courts were relieved
of their single greatest burden: the automobile. Along with pollution
and death on the highway, the automobile brings us court conges-
tion. Personal-injury cases flood the trial courts, and traffic cases
flood the criminal courts. 2
Speaking last November in Minnesota, Justice Alfred P. Murrah, successor
to Mr. Justice Tom Clark as director of the Federal Judicial Center, said, "It
is imperative that we find a better way, more expeditious and economical, of
resolving disputes that arise from the use of our highways."' 3
The recent study performed for the Department of Transportation by the
Federal Judicial Center shows that court costs of administering accident liti-
gation reached an estimated 133 million dollars as a result of over 220,000
lawsuits in 1968 and that over half of those suits required more than two years
to reach termination.'4
Ninety percent of the plaintiffs received some compensation from the defense
for their injuries. Half of the successful plaintiffs received 3,000 dollars or less
with their lawyers being paid approximately 35.5 percent of the recoveries under
contingent fee contracts. In addition, plaintiffs paid about 250 dollars in expen-
ses. Defense lawyers received an average of 819 dollars per case, regardless of
the verdict, plus the same amount in expenses as plaintiffs' lawyers. 5
10. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, § I, at 20, cols. 3-4.
II. The Record, Oct. 30, 1970, at 12, col. I.
12. Main, Only Radical Reform Can Save the Courts, FORTUNE, Aug. 1970, at 114.
13. Address by Justice Alfred P. Murrah, National Conference on Automobile Insurance
Reform, Nov. 23, 1970.




The upshot of all this is that in 1968 as a result of auto accident cases that
went to court, accident victims received about 700 million dollars in total net
returns, while lawyers received about 600 million dollars in fees and another 100
million dollars in expense reimbursement.', Adding the cost the public pays for
court administration, it is apparent that the process of litigating auto accident
cases costs more than the victims actually receive in settlement.
Further. this litigation seriously hampers the legal process. It was estimated
to occupy 17 percent of the court systems' total judge trial time."7 In addition,
it must be remembered that of all the cases Filed, 87 percent were terminated
before coming to trial and only seven percent reached final verdict and judg-
ment." s Thus, there is far greater use of the available court system's resources
than judge's trial time would indicate. In commenting upon the lengthy pre-
trial court proceedings in auto accident cases, the court, in Pinnick v. Cleary."
stated:
The time of the court consumed in this preliminary war of nerves
between counsel, or between claimant and insurer, is almost impos-
sible to estimate, but probably far exceeds that spent in the trial of
the small percentage of all entries which must be tried. "'
The Massachusetts court also pointed out that court systems in other nations
"have managed to solve the problem of the superabundance of motor vehicle
tort claims in one way or another," but that it remains "a cancer to be rooted
out in American courts."'
"Cancer" is an apt term, because motor vehicle injury claims also affect the
health of our court and judicial systems and the quality of justice and service
they render. In lamenting this fact, Cook County Circuit Court Administrative
Director Mackoff states:
. . . [Tihe court is being used merely as a forum for the claims
adjusting bargaining process. The judge becomes an umpire between
two parties who do not really seek a determination of the legal
matters involved. The court, sacrificing its traditional function of
deciding actual disputes, simply oversees the haggling between law-
yers of whether or how much to pay to whom.22
Judges. scholars and many others are increasingly distressed by growing
disrespect for the courts and the law. As one scholar puts it:
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id..at 8.
19. - Mass. - 271 N.E. 2d 592 (1971).
20. Id. at 603.
21. Id. at 604.
22. 1971 Hearings, supra note 7, at 147.
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An undesirable by-product of this wastefulness is that it encourages
exaggeration of injuries suffered, and even fraud and perjury, in
order to ensure that the amount which actually reaches the victim
is large enough to compensate him for his real losses.
23
This is one of the outgrowths of the need to determine legal "negligence,"
which Dean William Prosser describes as "a wobbly and uncertain standard
based upon the supposed mental processes of a hypothetical and non-existent
reasonable man."124 Dean Prosser states that, "the extent to which it has dam-
aged the courts and the legal profession by bringing the law and its administra-
tion into public disrepute can only be guessed. '",
Historical Development of the Two Cancers
How did all this all come about? Basically, because no group of public policy
makers ever sat down to devise a rational approach to the need for widespread
compensation for auto crash victims. Society allowed a system to develop which
attempts to allocate and distribute loss on the basis of concepts of causation.
In addition, the American judicial system must bear great responsibility for
making three fundamental decisions over the years that have led to the two
cancers that we find in the present system.
Choosing the Legal Theory
The first fundamental decision concerned the choice of legal theory under which
the costs of an auto crash were to be transferred from one person to another.
At the time of the early auto cases -around the turn of the 20th Century-the
courts had several options.
First, the courts could have said that a person who drives an automobile
"assumes the risks" arising from that activity and, hence, cannot recover his
losses from anyone else. That was one of the oldest legal theories available. 2
Perhaps if the courts had the opportunity to start all over again, this is what
they would do. This would be successful, because the insurance industry could
provide sound, direct benefits that would cover any combination of risks the
policyholder wants to insure against. It is the purpose of this paper to make
the plea for just such a system.
The second option open to the courts was to say that the auto is a "dangerous
23. MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES, supra note 5, at 78-79.
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 85, at 580 (3d ed. 1964).
25. Id.
26. See generally Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (1799); Howey v. Fisher,
122 Mich. 43, 80 N.W. 1004 (1899); Pomeroy v. Westfield, 154 Mass. 462, 28 N.E. 899 (1891);
Miner v. Conn. Riv. R. R., 153 Mass. 398, 26 N.E. 994 (1891).
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instrumentality" and that anyone who owned or used one had to assume the
liability for all losses resulting from its ownership or use. This theory of strict
or absolute liability was the second oldest legal theory available to the courts,
and was adopted from the beginning by several countries." The strict liability
theory could be the basis of a sound auto accident reparations system, but it
would not be so efficient, flexible and serviceable as a system under which a
policyholder covers his own risks, rather than the risks of some unknown third
party.
The third choice available to the courts, of course, was the tort liability or
negligence system. Its objectives were in conflict with the objectives of a true
auto accident reparations system. It was the newest and least tried of the legal
theories available2" and, from the vantage of 20-20 hindsight, it was the worst
possible choice from the standpoint of being the basis for an accident repara-
tions system.
Surely, the results of this choice could not have been foreseen by the judiciary
whose decisions were based in part on the trends and tempo of the times and in
part out of the limitation of the function of the courts. That is precisely one
reason why we should not be afraid to assess how times and tempos and public
needs have changed-and how a system developed to shift accident costs in the
days of a handful of horseless carriages has long ago broken down under the
weight of numbers of unplanned meetings between powerful mechanical mons-
ters. The fact remains that selection of the negligence system was an error and
that the need to determine fault for a crash is one of the two cancers in the
present auto accident reparations system.
Attorney's Fees and the Emergence of 'Pain and Suffering'
The second and third errors of the American courts are related. One resulted
from an effort to compensate for the other. Together they gave rise to the
second of the two cancers. The second error of the courts was to hold that a
claimant in tort could not recover reasonable attorney's fees as a part of his
damages. This was an error peculiar to the American courts. Although they
shared the same legal history and traditions, their judicial brethren in England
and Canada did not make the same mistake."9
The American courts mistakenly assumed that the recovery of reasonable
27. See Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe,
79 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1931).
28. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE
ACTION 36 (1970).
29. For a study pointing out that contingent fee arrangements are generally regarded as impro-
per elsewhere see P. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964).
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attorney's fees made necessary by a tort action would encourage litigation.
Again the facilities and capacity for extensive, independent research were not
available and another error was committed. The result of this second error was
the contingent fee arrangement. It was inevitable that if the claimant was not
going to recover his necessary attorney's fees, he would have to pay for them.
If the claimant did not have money to risk, he would have to give up part of
the recovery to which he would be entitled. Thus, the resulting system further
defeated the objectives and purposes of an auto accident reparation system.
To compensate for this second error the American courts began to recognize
recoveries in dollars in addition to those representing loss arising from the
accident. These were recoveries for intangible items such as "pain and suffer-
ing" which themselves could not be measured in dollars because they were not
recognized for purposes of replacing dollars or providing reparations as a result
of the accident. There are scholars who believe that this trend developed at least
in part to provide additional dollars from which the claimant could pay his
attorney's fees without impairing his basic economic reparations. They hold
this belief because the courts departed so much from the early rules about
damages that would be recognized and awarded by the courts.
The A 1A Approach
Together. then, these two errors spawned recoveries for indefinite dam-
ages-often billed as "pain and suffering" whether or not pain and suffering
truly were present-the second cancer in the existing reparations system. The
two cancers have infected and weakened the entire auto accident reparations
system. From our Association's studies it became apparent that if we were to
rectify public complaint that the existing system is incomplete, inequitable, slow
and expensive, we would have to cut out those cancers from the system. Accord-
ingly. three years ago our Association proposed a system under which everyone
injured in an auto accident would be reimbursed by his own insurance company
for his economic losses-swiftly, fairly and without the need to determine how
the crash was caused.
3
0
Our plan provides for payment of all of a policyholder's medical and hospital
expenses, including the costs of rehabilitation programs. without any policy
limits. We also would pay for the policyholder's present and future wage loss.
out-of-pocket expenses and costs of replacement services up to $750 per month
30. For the latest draft of the plan see AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PERSONAL AND
PROPERTY PROTECTION MOTOR VEIIICLE INSURANCE ACT (Draft No. 10, Aug. 10, 1970)
[unpublished draft in AIA's New York office].
[Vol. 21:338
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as part of the basic, compulsory plan. Payments for indefinite damages as such
would be excluded from the basic plan.
The AIA program would provide both a complete exemption from tort liabi-
liy in any state enacting the plan. and appropriate liability coverage for policy-
holders should they encounter a lawsuit in a state that has not enacted the plan.
However. it also would preserve common law procedures, including the right
to jury trial, for litigation of disputed claims. These would be issues between
the policyholder and his own insurance company, and would no longer involve
the somewhat remote insurance company of a third party.
No-Fault: A National Objective
Early in 1970. further evidence of the imperative need for complete reform of
the auto insurance system was presented by the New York State Insurance
Department in a thorough, well-documented indictment of the existing system
that also proposed a complete. no-fault reparations system."
Then, beginning in March of 1970 the U.S. Department of Transportation
[DOT] released 23 reports representing the most exhaustive body of evidence
ever developed on the need for fundamental change in the way people are
compensated for their auto crash losses. From that analysis the DOT and the
Nixon Administration concluded that the States should begin promptly to shift
to a first-party, no-fault compensation system for auto accident victims. The
Administration prepared a Congressional Resolution outlining in these terms
the national goals or principles toward which the States should be moving.
3
The following are the major provisions of that Resolution:
* A system in which every motorist would be required to carry insurance
protecting himself, his family and other uninsured people who may be injured
by him for all economic losses they incur up to specified amounts. Benefits
would be paid by the policyholder's own insurance company.
* Basic benefits should be payable to all accident victims without regard to
fault, excluding those who willfully injure themselves.
* The ultimate system should provide full coverage for all medical benefits.
with a relatively small deductible but with a very high mandatory limit. Medical
rehabilitation expenses would be included.
* Coverage should include a relatively high percentage of the injured's
earned income. A monthly benefit ceiling of perhaps $1.000 for three years is
cited as an example of effective income replacement.
31. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 4.
32. 1971 Hearings, supra note 7, at 308.
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0 The system also should cover the cost of necessary replacement of services
for the unemployed, such as housewives.
* In the ultimate system coverage of damage to property. including the
insured auto. might be required. but with fairly high deductibles permissible.
* The function of the reparations system should be to afford adequate com-
pensation to the accident victim at minimum cost. Benefits from all sources
should be coordinated and auto insurance should be the primary benefit source
whenever feasible.
0 Rehabilitation, avocational as well as vocational, should be a primary
function and objective of the compensation system.
* No recovery for any loss covered by the first-party, no-fault coverages
should be permitted in any private action for damages. The adversary process
thereby would be eliminated for the mass of accidents.
* The right to sue might be continued for intangible losses when a person
suffers permanent impairment or loss of function or permanent disfigurement,
or if medical expenses excluding hospital exceed a rather high dollar threshold.
Thus, according to Secretary Volpe, the Administration has decided on an
extensive no-fault auto insurance system as the needed national policy. At the
same time, the Administration said that reform should be reasonably uniform,
with room for experimentation and comparison, and that it should be accom-
plished by individual action of the States.
No-Fault: What "Rights" Are Really Affected?
The judiciary can expect to hear many allegations that no-fault auto insurance
systems remove rights of injured people to claim certain damages. The trial bar
actually compares "damages collected" with the "right to 'claim' damages, ' " ,
as if they were one in the same-as if the existing system fully compensated all
injured people for tangible and intangible losses past, present and future.
It is apparent that this is simply not true. First, if it were true, the public
hardly would be so dissatisfied with and so anxious to change the existing
system. 34 Second, we know from several objective studies that anywhere from
one-quarter to one-third of the people injured in auto accidents receive nothing
from the auto liability insurance system .3 Third. we know that those who
33. Ansley, No-Fault: The Wrong Approach, THE ATLANTA LAWYER, Oct. 1971.
34. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTO
INSURANCE (1970).
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCI-




recover do so not so much on the basis of actual loss or need for compensation.
as on their or their lawyer's ability to negotiate. bargain, dramatize, persuade
or threaten.3 6 Fourth. in the instance of those who are seriously injured in an
auto crash, we know that 55 out of every 100 get no compensation whatever
from the auto liability insurance system. 3- Fifth, we know that the 45 of every
100 seriously injured victims who do recover something receive on the average
less than half of their actual losses from all insurance sources combined-and
only one-sixth of their total economic loss from auto liability insurance. 31 Sixth.
we know that only three out of ten seriously injured victims who suffer $ 10,000
of economic loss as a result of an auto crash and who recover anything from
auto liability insurance receive more than half of their actual economic losses.
We also know that only one out of ten of such victims actually gets anything
more than his actual economic losses . 3 Seventh, we know that the average loss,
including future earnings, for someone permanently disabled through an auto
crash is 78.000 dollars, and that under the existing system the average recovery
is 12,556 dollars.41)
In the light of all this, how can it be claimed that the existing system compen-
sates fully for injuries sustained? Is it now sophistry to equate "damages col-
lected" with the "right to 'claim'?" In this case, two birds in the bush are worth
more than one in hand. Today, a person has the "right to claim" any and all
tangible and intangible losses, but those "rights" do not materialize into the
actual collection of damages as is implied. Such a misleading argument ill
serves the reputation of a professional status group.
In alleging that a complete no-fault plan removes some of a motorist's rights.
the trial bar should make clear that it is only the ability to claim damages for
intangible losses that is being removed, not the right to collect those damages.
The fact is that nine out of ten seriously injured auto victims do not collect
them. Out of fairness and intellectual honesty. we think that -the trial bar also
should point out that in exchange for the right to claim intangible losses, every
motorist is being guaranteed prompt payment of his economic losses, a right
he does not have today. In addition, under our proposed no-fault plan. every
policyholder would retain the right to sue his own company if there is a dispute
over benefits to be paid.
Otherwise. there are several other "rights" which the public should be very
happy to see disappear from the existing lawsuit system of auto insurance: the
36. See MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES, supra note 5, at 41-46.
37. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
INJURIES 3 (1970).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 41.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 53 (1970).
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right to go without compensation until the other party's insurance company
decides if the claim is valid; the right to wait an average of 16 months for a
court case to be settled; the right to pay far higher insurance premiums than
necessary and to receive far less in benefits than people should; the right of
innocent family members in a vehicle to go uncompensated for their injuries
should the driver be held legally liable for a crash; the right of the seriously
injured to do without necessary rehabilitation; the right to move to cheaper
housing. to go without adequate care for injuries, to borrow money to pay bills,
and the right to a lower standard of living. These "rights" are wrongs in the
existing system that must be remedied, and under no-fault they will be.
There is one other "right" of the existing system that will disappear that
some of the public may not be happy about. but it's disappearance is essential
if any reparations system is to operate fairly and efficiently. That is the "right"
to make a profit on minor injuries at the expense of fellow motorists, and it is
from here that the dollars will come to pay all injured people according to their
loss and need.
The State Rejbrni Laws-Failing to Meet our .National Objective
What has happened so far since the Nixon Administration set forth genuine no-
fault auto insurance reform as a national objective? The harsh truth is that none
of the reform laws enacted so far complies with all of the guiding principles
established by the DOT and the Nixon Administration. The Florida law" comes
closest, in providing compulsory no-fault compensation of up to 5.000 dollars
for each injured party and in prohibiting suits for pain and suffering unless there
is the serious, permanent injury cited by the DOT or unless medical expenses
exceed 1,000 dollars. The Florida law also is the only one that applies to damage
to autos, providing a no-fault system up to 550 dollars.
The Massachusetts law 2 operates in a similar f'ashion. but provides no-fault
compensation up to only 2,000 dollars and has a threshold of only 500 dollars
for suits for intangible losses.
The Illinois law43 fails to meet the Administration standards in several impor-
tant respects. For one thing. it does not require people to buy auto insurance
in the first place. For another. it does not prohibit damage suits against another
motorist at any time. For a third, it allows insurance companies to seek reim-
bursement from each other for benefits paid to their policyholders, and this will
require all the fault-finding procedures which add so much unnecessary cost to
41. Ch. 71-252, [1971] Fla. Laws 993.
42. Ch. 670, [1970] Mass. Acts 578.
43. P.A. 77-1430, [1971] II1. Pub. Acts 2213.
[Vol. 21:338
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the existing system. While the Illinois law does not meet the DOT recommenda-
tion for limitation on suits for pain and suffering, it does have the virtue of
limiting payments for pain and suffering by formula. Otherwise. the Illinois law
merely states that all insurance policies sold after January I. 1972. must include
certain medical and wage loss reimbursement by the policyholder's own insur-
ance company.
As for the other bills, Delaware" does not meet the DOT criteria because it
in no way restricts suits for damages, either for economic losses or for pain and
suffering. The law simply compels people to buy medical payments and wage
loss coverage from their own insurance company, in addition to standard liabil-
ity insurance. To that extent, the Delaware law is an attempt to see that all
motorists will receive compensation for their injuries. However, it removes none
of the reliance on the adversary process as DOT has suggested and is likely to
prove more expensive for motorists, rather than less expensive.
Oregon . 5 like Illinois. provides that all auto insurance policies sold after
January I must include medical and wage loss reimbursement coverages. How-
ever. the law does not require motorists to purchase any insurance at all. It also
fails to meet DOT criteria in that there is no change in the existing fault system
through elimination of damage suits or reduced use of the adversary system.
Oregon simply tacks on any overlay of first-party benefits for those who choose
to buy insurance at all. Such a manner "does nothing to correct the inequitites
and faults of the present law." 4
As for the South Dakota law.' 7 it simply is misleading to call it no-fault in
any way. shape or form. All the law says is that insurance companies must ojAr
medical expense and wage loss reimbursement coverages to their policyholders.
People need not accept the coverages any more than they have to buy insurance
at all. Therefore. South Dakota fails to meet any of the criteria for reform set
forth by the DOT. This is true of a similar provision enacted in Minnesota last
year."
Conclusion
Our Association prefers to believe that the state plans that simply provide an
overlay of medical and wage loss benefits without altering the existing fault
system indicate an attempt to provide coverage in some way for all auto acci-
44. Ch. 98 [1971] Del. Laws 55.
45. CCH [1971] Oregon New Laws, at 653.
46. Address by T. Lawrence Jones, Imported Car Dealers Conference, National Automobile
Dealers Association, October 12, 1971.
47. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 58-23-5 to 8 (Supp. 1971).
48. Laws of Minn. 1969, ch. 713, at 1272.
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dent victims, even though an inefficient, expensive and cumbersome way of
doing so has been chosen. We hope that those states are not deluding themselves
into thinking that they have passed a meaningful reform measure.
Everyone should be aware of the serious challenges facing the judiciary and
judicial administration today. There is little doubt that the nation's judicial-
legal talent and energy. the resources of the courts and the nation's tax dollars
could be better utilized, especially when it comes to playing the dreary. time-
consuming auto accident settlement game called, "who's at fault?".
There is little doubt that society simply will not provide enough new judges
and new courtrooms to clear up the problems of congestion and delay. The only
road open is the road of reform and the chief reform that must take place is to
remove auto accident cases from the adversary system.
The judiciary now has the opportunity to take a leadership role in cleaning
up the terrible problems that confront it and at the same time in providing the
public with a true auto accident reparations system. They should be urged to
act upon this challenge -quickly and decisively-before both the court system
and the existing auto liability insurance system collapse from their own weight
and expense.
[Vol. 21:338
